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A LIFE IN MY HANDS. By JACOB W. EBiLicm. New York:
Putnam. 1965. Pp. 365. $5.95.
[T]hat an advocate, by the sacred duty which he owes his client,
knows, in the discharge of that office, but one person in the world,
that client, and none other. To save that client, by all expedient
means, to protect that client, at all hazards and cost to all others,
and, among others, to himself, is the highest and most unquestioned
of his duties; and he must not regard the alarm, the suffering, the
torment, the destruction, which he may bring upon any other.
-Third Great Western Turnpike-Road
Co. v. Loomis, 32 N.Y. 127, 133 (1865)
(quoting 1 BROUGHAM'S SPEECHES 63)
It was Lord Brougham, not Jake Ehrlich, who thus sternly defined
the duties of the advocate; but the portrait projected by this auto-
biography is that of a man who would have enjoyed sharing a counsel
table with Brougham. As successful and expert as he is, Ehrlich could
not properly be called a "lawyer's lawyer," the title enjoyed by some
of our noted barristers. Jake Ehrlich is a client's lawyer. His belief in
Ia just and measured aggressiveness" (p. 25) in the service of his
client is the mortar holding this book together.
Unfortunately, the mortar does not always bind sufficiently. To
some extent this is probably the fate of most litigators who would
write their memoirs. The statesman, the inventor, the business exec-
utive, even the corporation lawyer, live with the long struggle, the
gradually developing trend, the cause doggedly championed. The
trial lawyer has only his cases, fascinating but episodic, abstracts of
the most tragic moments in the lives of related people. The Koda-
chrome flashes jerkily on the screen, even as the next slide drops into
place. In this book the cases are very many and the problems are par-
ticularly acute.
In sketching his childhood in rural Maryland, Ehrlich provides the
reader with a view of the developing pugnacity that has never
deserted him. At thirteen, he defended a younger brother by thrash-
ing a sadistic schoolteacher and confiscating his switch. "It was then
that I learned the occasional superiority of direct action over nego-
tiation" (p. 17). He has never forgotten it. We read next of Ehrlich's
soldiering and his prize fighting, the latter career abandoned only
when a bearded judge questioned the dignity of a shiner at the Bar
and promised a referral a month if young Ehrlich would hang up his
gloves.
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Then come the cases, presented in the format of a typical Ehrlich
day, but relying principally upon flash-backs. We see an attorney
whose every talent, energy and experience can be focused to a white-
hot point of advocacy. Ehrlich's knowledge of the Bible, which he
has read in English, Hebrew and Aramaic, served to convince a
critical witness to testify in a trial which also featured Ehrlich and
Jerry Geisler re-enacting an alleged rape for the edification of the
jury. Even Ehrlich's marriage by a small town justice of the peace
helped preserve the liberty of a client tried before that same judge
twenty-five years later.
Ours is an adversary system and Mr. Ehrlich's autobiography
points out the disabilities as well as the advantages of this system as
applied to the criminal law. Some of Mr. Ehrlich's acquittals prob-
ably did not require the "Master," as he is universally known in
San Francisco. No doubt a journeyman might successfully have
defended Jean Collins, who shot her paramour as the only alternative
to a thirteen story plunge. Most of Ehrlich's cases were nowhere near
that easy. It was the fierce combativeness and the will to win nurtured
by the adversary system that sent Ehrlich up the creaking steps of a
Chinatown tenement at 4 a.m. to remove, from its fantastic hiding
place, the evidence necessary to acquit Louis Quan. It was in the
service of the same system that Ehrlich developed the skill necessary
to use that evidence to convince the jury. The adversary system
worked perfectly for Quan. But one cannot help wondering about all
the others, the patsies, the chronic victims, condemned before trial
by the half-heartedness of their own defenders in situations where
our system of justice assumes and demands a rough equality of
energy, talent and resources between prosecution and defense.
In civil cases, that equality is more often present. The resources
which litigants are willing and able to commit to the struggle tend to
match the value of what is at hazard. In the criminal case the depth
of the client's pocket bears no necessary correlation with the poten-
tial sentence or the competence of the prosecutor. It should be a
source of pride to no one if life and liberty are to be determined by
whether a defendant can afford the services of Ehrlich or his few
peers.
The converse is also true. We all have a stake in the conviction of
the guilty. The educative function of the criminal law is ill served




By and large, Ehrlich paints a displeasing picture of district at-
torneys. Again and again he complains of the lack of compassion
and the ferocity of his public adversaries. There are exceptions, which
the author graciously acknowledges, but in the main, Ehrlich finds
prosecutors undeterred by any sense of justice. Yet the prosecutor
determined on a conviction at any price is, like Ehrlich himself, a
product of a carefully developed and substantially untrammeled will
to victory which bottoms our traditional system of criminal litigation.
In discussing the famous defense of Billie Holiday, Ehrlich writes,
"I was going to have to cut corners, throw curves and deal an occa-
sional card from the bottom of the deck if this palpable frame-up
were to be short-circuited" (p. 151). If this is acceptable on the part
of defense counsel, is it not inevitable that a prosecutor, raised in the
same school, will similarly cut corners? Self-justification is easily
produced: the prosecutor is already convinced of guilt on the basis of
reliable but inadmissible evidence; the defendant is a menace to
society; and equally significant in this context, the defendant is repre-
sented by counsel who will attempt to cheat the law of its victim by
himself cutting corners. In theory, the roles of prosecution and
defense counsel are not reciprocal.' In practice they often are.2
It would seem to this reviewer that we can afford a much more
efficacious management of our system of criminal justice than that so
vividly depicted in this book.
The question of the attorney's duty to his client and to the court
and the question of injustices in the administration of the criminal
law are only two of many controversial issues discussed or touched
upon by this book. The author's view on these subjects-which range
from Humpty Dumpty to CORE-will be stimulating to any
thoughtful reader. Ehrlich may sometimes be wrong. He is never in
doubt.
Indeed, he wears his cockiness like his celebrated starched handker-
chief for all to see. The author frankly states "there will be no
modest reticences in my book" (p. 361), and the reviewer has found
none. Perhaps, as Ehrlich writes, "to disclaim pride of self is prob-
1 See Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935) (the Supreme Court's view
of a prosecutor's duties).
2 The misconduct or alleged misconduct of prosecutors is the subject of a con-
siderable body of law tending to support Mr. Ehrlich's contentions. See, e.g., Mooney
v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 (1935) (claim of perjured testimony knowingly used);
Berger v. United States, supra note (startling prejudicial cross-examination). See State
v. Giles, 239 Md. 458, 212 A.2d 101 (1965) (dissent contains a discussion of the law
on this subject).
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ably the basest of subterfuges" (p. 24), but some reticence is at least
a literary convention. Its total absence tends to distract and eventu-
ally to annoy.
This book is not a great biography in the sense that it provides any
real insight into the character of its subject. Neither does it strive to
be a technical manual, although the author, who has written eleven
books on professional subjects, would have little difficulty with a
legal primer. Rather, this volume is intended for the spare time read-
ing of the lawyer or interested layman.
There is always a fascination in watching anything done terribly
well. As a criminal lawyer and as a champion of his clients in civil
or criminal matters, Ehrlich has few equals. The many stories that
make up this book are well and colorfully told, and the reviewer
found the reading of this book an enjoyable experience.
PHILIP ZIMET*
* Member of the State Bar of New York.
